The Civil Justice System has become excessively adversarial, slow and expensive; and this is true of the trials of allegations that there has been negligence in the delivery of health care, whether by doctors, nurses or other health professionals. Medical negligence actions are a subspecies of professional negligence actions, which in turn are part of the largest category of cases proceeding through the courts today that is, personal injury actions. However, neither personal injury actions generally nor other professional negligence actions create the same problems as are created by actions alleging medical negligence.
THE NEEDS OF LITIGANTS I found during my inquiry into the Civil Justice System' that there were five respects in which medical negligence actions conspicuously failed to meet the needs of the litigants. First, the relationship between the costs of the litigation and the amount involved was disproportionate. The costs were peculiarly excessive, especially in low-value cases. Second, delay the period that elapsed before claims were resolved was more often unacceptable in the case of medical negligence claims than in other classes of proceedings. Third, unmeritorious cases were pursued and clear-cut claims were defended for longer than happened in other areas of litigation. Fourth, the success rate was lower than in other personal injury litigation. Finally, the lack of cooperation between the parties to the litigation and their mutual suspicion as to motives were more intense than in other classes of litigation. Consequently, in general it is only legally aided litigants who can afford the risks of bringing this class of litigation. My inquiry indicated that 90% of litigants who brought this class of action were legally aided; that is, in the great majority of cases both sides were being funded by the public purse. There is good reason for concern about the millions of pounds being spent by National Health Service Trusts and other defendants on legal costs money that would be much better devoted to compensating victims or better still to improving standards of care.
That is one unattractive aspect of the situation. Another is the position of those who are not eligible for legal aid.
Although my reforms are designed to increase access to justice, it is part of my message that litigation should be avoided if at all possible. None the less there should not be a situation where, if the person is negligently treated, he is deprived of the compensation to which under our system he is entitled because he does not come within the narrow band of those who are eligible for legal aid. It is bad enough to believe that your health has suffered because of the negligence of those who treated you. It is worse still to find that, because of your limited resources, you are deprived of the opportunity of proving this in a court of law. I will not forget the extraordinary anger of those who had been subject to this experience.
THE NEEDS OF MEDICAL STAFF
The pain is not, however, confined to the potential plaintiffs. It is experienced also by those who delivered the health care of which complaint is made. Their ambition throughout has been to help the patient, but instead they find themselves subject to hurtful allegations of negligent mistreatment which often surface after the carer has ceased to have any real recollection of what happened. It is intensely frustrating: the medical carers believe that if only they could have an opportunity to discuss the issues with the patient they could satisfactorily explain why things turned out as they did. However, outdated conventions as to behaviour make this impossible. The doctor is worried that if he apologizes his words may be used in evidence against him or prejudice his position with medical defence bodies. So on the one hand we have patients who feel let down because treatment has gone wrong, sometimes because of unrealistic expectations; and, on the other, doctors who react defensively to what they see as unjustified attacks from patients.
Clearly, a way must be found to break the barriers between patient and carers so that litigation is avoided wherever possible. It would save the costs to which I have referred; and it could result in those patients who deserve to be compensated receiving proportionate compensations voluntarily, in an atmosphere that did not poison relations between the patients and those who had been treating them.
At the time of my inquiry, the National Health Service was already changing its methods for the handling of claims. In November 1995 the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) came into existence and now administers a voluntary scheme, the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts, which makes it in effect a mutual insurer for those trusts (the majority) that opt for membership. There is also an Existing Liability Scheme, which covers claims before April 1995. At the time my inquiry reported in the summer of 1996, 20 000 claims were still outstanding against the NHS and some of those were individually for in excess of £l1m.
One achievement of my inquiry was that it became a catalyst for the establishment of a medical negligence working group, bringing together, for the first time, individuals from all sides of medical negligence litigation. I am especially pleased that the group established an umbrella organization to encourage the process of change. It is only by working together that we will identify and implement satisfactory long-term solutions.
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE WOOLF INQUIRY
The general recommendations of my inquiry will help but they will go only part of the way. They include proposals for simpler ways of bringing claims. They enable formal offers to settle to be made without having to start actions beforehand. They will result in weaker claims being weeded out. They involve greater specialization on the part of judges, complementing the greater specialization of the legal profession. There will be better training for those on the judicial side-and I would like to see that training also made available to the medical profession (not only to help you cope with claims made against you for medical negligence but also to make you a more effective medical expert). Perhaps the most important recommendation was that the judge was to become responsible for managing the litigation.
These proposals complement the improvements in the complaint system which I hope will be the result of the Wilson Report. We can expect greater involvement of the Health Service Ombudsman, who can now adjudicate on clinical cases.
OPENNESS AND COMMUNICATION
How do we design a system that meets the needs of doctors and other health professionals as well as patients (the existing system, I suspect, was designed primarily to meet the interests and convenience of lawyers)? First, we need a mechanism to elicit at the outset what an injured patient wants. For what it is worth, during my inquiry litigants repeatedy told me that all they sought was an explanation or have been forced into litigation by lack of communication from those representing the medical profession.
What about doctors? They would like a discreet form of private adjudication by, in some cases, a medical rather than legal tribunal. They want a system which does not encourage NHS trusts to settle cases over their heads regardless of liability.
A change in culture is not easily achieved, but we need to persuade those responsible for providing medical care to be more open when things go wrong. When complaints are met by silence, it is not surprising patients think the worst. It would be a giant step if, in those cases where it is justified, there was a spontaneous offer of compensation. I cannot, of course, hope to make litigation in this area redundant. This could be achieved by a government decision to introduce a no-fault scheme providing reasonable compensation. I confess to being in favour of such a scheme. It would avoid the present appalling wasted expenditure on both sides-expenditure that is not limited to the lawyers' fees but also includes diversion of doctors and other carers from their more important duties. However, a compensation scheme of this sort is not at present on the political agenda so we have to start more modestly.
One suggestion that I received was that doctors should be obliged as part of their ethical code to inform the patient if they discover an act or omission in their care and treatment that may have caused injury. There is a comparable requirement in the Law Society's code of professional conduct. What is acceptable for lawyers may not be appropriate for doctors or other medical carers, but consideration might be given to this proposal. If we are not going as far as this we should be able to reduce the problems of cost and delay somewhat by proper incident reporting and record keeping. This is a prerequisite for the openness necessary to initiate a less adversarial culture. In return for greater openness on the part of health carers, potential litigants must be prepared to place their cards on the table (face up) at a much earlier stage than happens now. Once a patient has decided to bring an action, the grounds of the claim should be notified to the defendant at least three months before an action is started. The defendant can then properly investigate the claim and decide whether to make an offer to dispose of the case before substantial costs have been incurred. If the defendants decide to contest the claim they should provide at the end of their inquiries a reasoned answer that can be taken into account by a potential plaintiff before he or she embarks on litigation. Especially in those cases where a claimant would have to rely on legal aid, the reasoned answer could prevent unmeritorious claims being pursued further. This would be part of a protocol of best practice designed to limit litigation to cases in which it is justified. apology that was never forthcoming. All too often patients 365
The courts will support the protocol by using the enhanced sanctions proposed in my recommendations.
The openness on both sides that the protocols encourage will in turn provide the information necessary for disputes to be resolved wherever possible by alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This could be dealt with in-house by hospitals: a hospital has much to gain from making available mediators and neutral claim evaluators at its own expense. Both sides of the legal profession are now with others providing lawyers who are highly skilled in this work. A pilot mediation scheme of this nature has already been set up. While it may be premature for the courts to insist on ADR, it is sufficiently established to justify the court taking into account an unreasonable refusal to resort to ADR when determining what costs should be awarded.
A SPECIALIZED JUDICIARY
The courts have to offer more specialization than hitherto. Judges in England have always prided themselves on being generalists but the issues are now so complex that expert knowledge is required. It takes time to instruct a judge who has no background knowledge of the intricacies of this area of negligence.
A Master of the Supreme Court has already been earmarked to deal with the interlocutory stages of these cases in the High Court and the same thing should happen in major centres in other parts of the country. You also need a judge to try the case who understands the medical issues to which this litigation can give rise. It is for this reason I favour a special list for cases of this nature in the High Court, so that they can come before a judge whose experience is equal to that of the lawyers for the parties.
EXPERT WITNESSES AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
That brings me to a further problem area-namely, evidence. I sense that the medical profession is not comfortable about the existing polarization, whereby medical experts tend to be categorized as plaintiff's or defendant's experts. They are looked upon by the side which has instructed them-and this can be their own perception of their position-as hired guns, brought in to fight to the best of their ability on behalf of the side that is employing them. It is especially unfortunate that this should be so in medical cases, because the court depends on medical advice to resolve the issues of liability, causation, and quantum. Liability has to be determined in accordance with the Bolam Test that 'a medical person is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men round, a man is not negligent, if he acts in accordance with such a practice merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view.' In relation to causation the difficult task is to decide what would have been the condition of the plaintiff if the mistreatment had not occurred-i.e. to what extent has the negligence made the condition of the patient worse. As to quantum, the prognosis can make the damages difficult to ascertain. In all three areas the court is dependent upon evidence of an expert to assist them to come to the right conclusion.
While there has been some improvement, it can still be very difficult to find an expert if you are a plaintiff. This is because of the understandable reluctance, in the healthcare professions, to criticize colleagues. The result is that those experts who are prepared to give reports on behalf of plaintiffs are diverted from their practice and become overdependent on medico-legal reporting for their livelihoodwhich can further undermine their independence.
My report seeks to improve matters by making clear that the expert's first responsibility is to the court and not to the side that instructs him or her. For this reason reports are to be made to the court. I would go further. There are some issues near the 'cutting edge' of medical science where there are two schools of thought. However, there are many areas where proper medical practice is not a matter of controversy and the question is whether that practice has been adhered to. There are many issues as to quantum where one opinion is very likely to be similar to another opinion. Thus I believe there is scope for the joint instruction of a single expert, at least in the first place, in those cases where there is no controversial medical issue. A breakthrough is needed, because at present both sides contend that they cannot trust the expert instructed by the other side. The more cooperative approach that we need will only arise if the independence of the expert is clear. At present one has the ludicrous position that, because experts and those who instruct them are not trusted, the parties will not even agree to sequential as opposed to simultaneous disclosure of experts' reports. There should also be more frequent meetings between experts to resolve issues. Lack of communication between experts often explains their failure to reach agreement.
Undoubtedly training could help to bring about the change of culture that is required. Here, as in other areas, I was immensely grateful to the Royal Colleges for the support they gave to my initiatives. I understand why the Royal Colleges cannot themselves 'police' the experts. They have, however, provided encouragement to bodies such as the Academy of Experts and the Institute of Expert Witnesses which can assist in raising standards.
The single report will have a particularly important role in development of fast-track procedures for small claimsskilled in that particular art . . . putting it the other way which are going to increase substantially in numbers, partly because of the advent of conditional fees, partly because of my reforms.
A COOPERATIVE WAY FORWARD I hope that it is apparent my reforms (which are already being implemented) are designed to achieve a cooperative way forward for the medical profession, the legal profession and the judiciary. The courts in other areas have seen their role as supportive and not hostile to the medical and caring professions, and this is true of medical negligence as well. In the past we have not always been sympathetic to the problems of those in the medical professions when requiring them to attend court. Here I hope that modem science will help us do better in the future. I have in mind the use of video evidence, which could be particularly beneficial to busy consultants.
We all have an interest in ensuring that, where court proceedings are necessary, they are efficient, effective and user friendly. As the ethical and legal issues they have to resolve become more and more complex, the medical professions do need the support of the court. Sometimes it is a pure issue of law as in the Royal College of Nursing case-what part can a nurse play in terminating a pregnancy without being under the immediate supervision of a doctor? Then there are situations where issues of law and ethics merge and there are agonizing questions of deciding whether life support machines should be turned off, as in the Tony Bland case. Here the courts developed a wholly new procedure to protect the medical profession. The law was far from clear, and the courts have provided clarity while at the same time taking the responsibility in an appropriate case for saying yes or no. A further example is the case of Re M and B which was recently decided. The extent to which the Family Division of the High Court has built up special skills in these matters is illustrated by the facts of that case. There the consultant obstetrician sought a declaration from the High Court that it would be lawful to carry out a caesarean delivery on a young lady who was 40 weeks pregnant. She was admitted to hospital on 14 February. An application was made on 18 February at 9.25 pm, and at 9.55 pm a declaration was granted that it would be appropriate to perform a caesarean section without her consent, restraint being used if necessary. She appealed and at 11.00 pm on the same day the Court of Appeal sat in open court and heard counsel for the lady concerned, for the Health Authority and for the Official Solicitor. The appeal was dismissed at 1.00 am. Not the best example of the law's delays. I emphasize that the hearing took place in open court because there were complaints suggesting that the rights of the young woman had been taken away behind closed doors. What had happened was that the patient had attended the antenatal clinic on 13 February and the fetus was found to be in a footling or incomplete breech presentation. The risk to the unborn child was assessed at 50% although there was little physical danger to the mother. The mother signed the appropriate consent form for a caesarean section when admitted but subsequently refused to provide blood samples. Although she continued to agree to a caesarean, she was not prepared to allow blood samples to be taken or to undergo anaesthesia by way of injection. A different approach was then adopted suggesting use of a mask for the purposes of administering the anaesthesia.
Although the risks were fully explained to the mother she initially decided on 18 February not to consent to the caesarean section because of fear of an injection. By 3.00 pm that day she was refusing to discuss her problems. However, she went into labour and there followed a series of changes of attitude which culminated when she was in the operating theatre at 9.00 pm in her once again refusing to cooperate. After the decision of the Court of Appeal she signed the necessary consents and was delivered of her baby boy with her cooperation.
A life was at stake and so were important issues of the rights of the mother and the unborn child. So reasons for the decision were handed down later. The courts accepted that they do not have jurisdiction to impose medical treatment against the wishes of a competent mother, even to protect the life of the unborn child. To do this is an assault that can result in criminal proceedings. However, in the particular case the court took the view that the mother's refusal to accept the prick of the anaesthetist's needle when she consented to the caesarean section was totally irrational. The fear of needles was preventing her making a decision at all. She was, in the words of the court, 'suffering an impairment of mental functioning which disabled her', and in the emergency the court decided that doctors were free to administer the anaesthetic if that was in her and the child's best interest. So in that case at any rate the court was able to come to a conclusion which protected both the unborn child and the mother. That will not be the situation always and, the courts' powers being limited, clearly consideration by Parliament of the issues is required. Meanwhile the courts will do their best within the law to help the profession exercise its skills in the interests of patients REFERENCE I Access to Justice: Final Report by the Right Honourable the Lord Woolf Master of the Rolls. London: HMSO, 1996. 
